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ABSTRACT
The abundance of automatically-triggered lifelogging cameras is a privacy threat to bystanders.
Countering this by deleting photos limits relevant memory cues and the informative content of
lifelogs. An alternative is to obfuscate bystanders, but it is not clear how this impacts the lifelogger’s
recall of memories. We report on a study in which we compare viewing 1) unaltered photos, 2) photos
with blurred people, and 3) a subset of the photos after deleting private ones, on memory recall.
Findings show that obfuscated content helps users recall a lot of content, but it also results in recalling
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less accurate details, which can sometimes mislead the user. Our work informs the design of privacy-
aware lifelogging systems that maximizes recall and steers discussion about ubiquitous technologies
that could alter human memories.
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INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
Sidebar 1: Original photo of three par-
ticipants (top) vs. obfuscated version
(bottom) where bodies are blurred
(gaussian blur, radius = 40 px). We
found that obfuscated lifelogs allow
viewers to remembermore details but
with less accuracy.
“Environmental lifelogging” in this context
is the recording of the environment using infras-
tructure cameras in the space capturing third-
person views of the participants. For further
examples, refer to [5].
Sidebar 2: Definition of “Environmen-
tal lifelogging”.
Lifelogging can support reminiscence, reflection, and searching past moments [3]. Images promote
more detail-rich recall compared to other types of data [9] as they contain rich contextual information
[11]. Thus, pictorial lifelogs were extensively researched as a means to augment human memory (e.g.,
[1, 6, 15]). However, a key challenge to adopt a pictorial lifelogging service is properly addressing
privacy concerns (e.g., [10]) as they expose the activities of individuals surrounding the wearer of the
camera more than they expose the lifelogger themselves. This is particularly true for environmental
lifelogging [5]. Previous work counteracted this problem by 1) deleting photos: this can be done post
hoc or by preventing the capture of photos if privacy-sensitive situations are detected [16], or by 2)
obfuscating the individuals, for example by inpainting them and replacing them by avatars [13]. The
second approach is particularly promising as it protects the individuals’ privacy while maintaining
good utility and user experience [13].
Although previous works (e.g., [7, 13]) investigated the impact of obfuscation on privacy protection
and user experience, it remains unclear how obfuscation impacts the recall of memories. Closing this
gap is crucial as recalling memories is one of the main motivations behind lifelogging. Therefore, we
report on a two-stage pilot user study (N=12) in which we compare the impact of obfuscation using
body blurring vs. the deletion on the recalled memories from pictorial lifelogs (we will hereafter refer
to them as lifelogs for simplicity). Participants first took part in an eventful interaction session and
then returned after 4-5 days to recall memories when viewing 1) 20 unaltered photos (baseline), 2)
obfuscated versions of the 20 photos where persons are blurred, and 3) five of the 20 original photos
after deleting private ones.
Our results suggest that blurred photos enabled users to remember more details than deleted
photos. However, blurred photos degraded the accuracy of the recalled details in comparison to
deletion of the photos in some cases. This implies that privacy-preserving obfuscated photos using
body blurring are good for remembering more about a forgotten topic but not for recalling accurate
details. As such, our work sheds light on a trade-off between protecting the privacy in lifelogs and
undermining the lifelogs’ potential as a memory prosthetic. Additionally, it is a first milestone to
spark a discussion about potential use cases for altering memories via ubiquitous technologies.
METHODOLOGY
Our pilot study was composed of two lab sessions. The first session (Session 1) was to create an
environmental lifelog of all participants in a common eventful interaction to evaluate their recall in
the next session. The second session (Session 2) was to compare the impact of applying the privacy-
protection methods to the common lifelogs on the recall quality of the events.
Session 1: Building the lifelog in a controlled event
Twelve participants were invited to Session 1 that lasted approximately 90 minutes. The session was
photographed using two cameras in the room from different angles to create an environmental lifelog
(third-person view). Participants were informed about the recording, their consent and demographic
data was collected. We introduced the participants to the domain of lifelogging and obfuscation of
photos creating an environment of open discussions. Afterwards, participants were split into random
teams of four and played a locally popular board game. The game’s goal is to move your playing
pieces as fast as possible into the safe zone using your dice score. We modified the game rules and
asked participants to physically swap seats upon getting certain dice values. The objective was to
make the lifelogs recorded during gameplay more dynamic and to reduce potential bias and confusion
from having most of the lifelogs seemingly static.
Dataset collection. In the first session, we collected over 450 photos. We used fixed temporal sampling
to select the presented photos (memory cues). We sampled at five-minute intervals during the
introduction and discussions. However, we reduced the interval to three minutes during the game
part as it lasted for a shorter period of time (about 20 minutes). Each participant appeared at least
once in their experimental lifelog dataset.
C1 (baseline) Participants received 20 original
photos.
C2 (obfuscation) Participants received an ob-
fuscated version of photos in (C1), where all
persons were blurred (see sidebar 1). We used
body blurring because of positive results in prior
work [2, 8, 12] and its wide adoption in research
and industry (e.g. Google Maps).
C3 (deletion) Participants received only a sub-
set of five original photos from (C1), mimick-
ing deletion for privacy protection. We equally
sampled them fromC1 (baseline) dataset across
time to avoid biases in deleting particular par-
ticipants.
Sidebar 3: The three conditions used
to evaluate the impact of the privacy-
protection method on information re-
call from lifelogs.
Personal questions (e.g., “Every participant in-
troduced themselves at the beginning by giving a
short talk. Can you remember the hair color of
Anna?”)
Procedural questions (e.g., “Please tell us the
procedure of the first session as specific as possi-
ble.”)
Game questions (e.g., “How many times did
the players in your group have to swap their play-
ing pieces?”).
Sidebar 4:Memory questions adminis-
trated in session 2
Session 2: Evaluating the recall
Session 2 took place four to five days after session 1 to ensure a realistic decay of information in the
memory [11], lasting for approximately 90 minutes. We re-invited the participants to individually
review the lifelogs from session 1. To reduce potential bias due to learning effects about the lifelog’s
content, we therefore opted for a between-subjects experiment design. We covered one independent
variable, the privacy-protection method, with three conditions (see Sidebar 3) and measured their
impact on information recall.
Each team of four was assigned to a condition. Our aim was to measure participants’ recall and if
they perceived the photos as helpful for remembering details from session 1. Thus, participants filled
in a questionnaire where they answered 30 questions about details that happened in Session 1 (see
sample questions in Sidebar 4). For each condition, we asked participants to answer the questionnaire:
1) before viewing the memory cues (pre-questionnaire) and 2) after viewing them, i.e., photos of the
respective condition (post-questionnaire). This was done to account for prior knowledge of the answers
and to identify any improvements resulting from having seen the memory cues. Participants were
allowed to navigate through the photos as long as they wanted. They were also allowed to improve
their answers to the pre-questionnaire when filling the post-questionnaire. On 5-point Likert scales,
participants estimated the helpfulness of the photos in aiding recall during the post-questionnaire.
Participants and Recruitment
We recruited 12 participants (3 females) via university mailing lists aged between 20 and 32 years
old (mean=24.2 years, SD=3.72). Participants were compensated with an e-shop voucher worth 20e.
To motivate participants to put an effort in their guesses, we also arranged a raffle for an additional
voucher, where participants who performed the best in session 2 had the highest chance in winning.
RESULTS: HOW DID THE PRIVACY-PROTECTION METHOD IMPACT THE RECALL?
Sidebar 5: Overview of the correct-
ness level for each condition (C1-C3).
(A) Obfuscation of persons was associ-
atedwith the highest number of semi-
correct overall answers, while dele-
tion of photos was associatedwith the
highest number ofwrong answers. (B)
However, reviewing the answers us-
ing obfuscated photos (C2) resulted
in the lowest ratio of correct answers
and the highest ratio of semi-correct
and wrong answers.
Inspired by the methodology of Le et al. [11], two researchers labeled each answer to the memory
questionnaire’s questions as: 1) correct when the answer is consistent with the expected one, 2)
semi-correct when parts of the answer are correct (e.g., remembering the outfit of a participant instead
of his name) and 3) wrong when the answer is incorrect. We also computed a custom metric, which
we refer to as the Recall Correctness Score (RCS). The correctness labels were scored as follows: two
points for correct answers, one point for semi-correct answers and zero points for wrong answers. The
RCS is the summation of the weights per participant.
Correctness of recalled memories
We compared the distribution of correctness labels across the conditions accounting for all answers
in the post-questionnaire (see Sidebar 5A). Our preliminary results suggest that participants in C2
(obfuscation) had more semi-correct answers compared to C3 (deletion) (34.17% and 22.5% respectively).
C3 (deletion) resulted in more wrong answers compared to C2 (obfuscation) (33.33% and 23.33%
respectively). The trend persisted if we only evaluate the answers that were reviewed and updated. All
conditions had a comparable ratio of correct answers. We compared the average RCS scores between
the pre-questionnaire (without photos) and the post-questionnaire (with photos) for each condition (see
Sidebar 6). The RCS increased after reviewing the photos in all conditions by 29.46% for C1 (baseline),
followed by 14.66% in C3 (deletion), then 12.6% in C2 (obfuscation).
Improvements after viewing the photos
We compared the distribution of the correctness labels across the conditions using the changed
answers only from the post-questionnaire (see Sidebar 5B). A changed answer corresponds to adding
extra information to the answer or completely changing it irrespective of its correctness label. C1
(baseline) and C3 (deletion) had a similar ratio of reviewed correct answers (46% and 44.83% of the
reviewed answers respectively). However, C2 (obfuscation) resulted in an inferior ratio of correct
answers compared to other conditions (31.58%). Nevertheless, C2 (obfuscation) resulted in the highest
semi-correct reviewed answers (36.84%) compared to C1 (baseline) (32%) and C3 (deletion) (27.59%). C2
(obfuscation) also resulted in the highest ratio of wrong answers (31.58%) while C1 (baseline) had the
least ratio (22%). This suggests that changes made after viewing C2 (obfuscation) photos are the least
correct. However, it encouraged semi-correct and wrong changes.
Sidebar 6: The figure shows a compar-
ison between the trends of the Recall
Correctness Score (RCS) before view-
ing photos, and after viewing photos.
The RCS is directly proportional to
the quantity and the quality of the
photos used in reviewing the answers.
LESSON LEARNT: AMBIGUOUS LIFELOGS MIGHT DISTORT MEMORIES
In contrast to C2 (obfuscation), participants updated their answers to the post-questionnaire in the C1
(baseline) and C3 (deletion) conditions when they remembered the information on their own or saw
it in one of the photos, leading to correct answers. However, the number of correct answers in C2
(obfuscation) drops compared to the other conditions because it involves the possibility of guessing
or wrongful cueing due to participants seeing distorted photos. We believe this is also magnified
because of the retrieval induced forgetting phenomenon [4], where remembering an unintended piece
of information leads to inhibiting the recall of another requested one. This also aligns with Schachter’s
work [14] about two common memory sins: mis-attribution, i.e., the tendency to confuse the source
of a memory with another, and the suggestibility, i.e., the tendency to mix false suggestions made
by others with the original memory. Thus, our pilot study results suggest that blurring is good for
remembering more about a forgotten topic, but not for recalling accurate details of memories.
Conclusion and Future Work. In this work we reported on a pilot study where we investigated the
impact of privacy-aware obfuscation in lifelogging on recall of memories. Participants viewed unaltered
photos, photos with blurred people, and a subset of the photos after deleting private ones. We found
that blurring improves quantitiy of recalled details, but does not improve the accuracy of recall.
Although blurring for obfuscation is commonly used in research [7, 13] and industry (e.g., Google
Street View), we cannot make claims about the impact of other techniques on memory recall. We
plan to compare in the impact of obfuscation in explicit photo capturing contexts such as taking
selfies. We also plan to further investigate: 1) mechanisms to utilize this effect in supporting useful
memory alterations in cases like blocking memories for patients with post traumatic stress disorder or
reviving memories for patients with temporary memory loss and 2) protecting users against malicious
use-cases such as implanting fake memories. Exploring such issues brings lifelogging one step closer
to real life applications as a viable alternative for externalizing memory prosthetics.
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